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Abstract
Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations.
These i-bounds generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show
that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not
require transitivity. The new i-bounds are sharp under the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
(SARP). By requiring transitivity they can be used to bound welfare measures. The new bounds on
welfare measures are shown to be operationalized through algorithms that are easy to implement.
1 Introduction
Demand analysis is a powerful tool for the measurement of the behaviour and distributional e¤ects
of price and income changes. A policy maker may, for example, be interested in the impact on the
consumers well-being of an introduction of a tax on the fat content of food or of a change in the indirect
taxes on gasoline. The common characteristic of such taxes is that they change the relative prices faced
by the consumer. How the consumer reacts to this, by choosing an alternative consumption bundle, is
subject of the analysis of demand behaviour. Typically the researcher estimates the unknown parameters
of a parametric demand system and uses these estimates to calculate pre- and post-reform demands
and associated indirect utilities (see, for example, Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997). Comparing
these indirect utilities then allows the econometrician to evaluate the impact of the policy reform on
the consumers well-being. One particularly useful cardinalization of the indirect utility function is
Samuelsons (1974) money metric indirect utility function, which allows one to express the change in
well-being in monetary units. Depending on the base price that is used in the analysis, this approach
leads to the well-known compensating variation (base price equals the post-reform prices) and equivalent
variation (base price equals pre-reform prices) that were proposed by Hicks (1939).
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A major disadvantage of standard demand and welfare analyses is that they rely on the functional
specication of the indirect utility function that is used. An alternative way to analyze policy reforms
is based on the revealed preference (RP) approach, whose foundations were laid down by Samuelson
(1938, 1948), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). The RP approach
makes use of methods from nite mathematics, which translate conditions for rational consumption
behaviour into testable implications which do not depend on any assumptions about the specication of
the consumers demand system or the particular representation of her rational preferences. The major
disadvantage of the RP approach, however, is that the predictions of demand responses derived from
its restrictions are set-valued, i.e. it is only possible to recover bounds on predicted demands.
As a response Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) proposed blending these two ap-
proaches by combining Engel curve estimation with RP conditions. This has shown to be a productive
technique. Firstly, it makes the RP conditions applicable to the types of datasets which are widely
available to researchers (such as the Family Expenditure Survey from the UK or the Consumption Ex-
penditure Survey from the US). Secondly, the approach is easy to implement and therefore contributes
to the practical usefulness of RP conditions. Finally, and principally, it allows for empirical RP analysis
with substantial discriminatory and forecasting power.1
However, whilst Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008) showed how to improve bounds on the
demand responses to price changes, they did so without fully exploiting all of the empirical implications
of rational preferences. Indeed, transitivity is not required for their e-bounds. We show that e-bounds
are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Further improvements are, in general,
possible if preferences can also be assumed to satisfy transitivity.2 That is if preferences satisfy the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP).
For welfare calculations transitivity is, in general, required. This is because non-transitivity can lead
to cycles and path-dependence if one attempts to integrate back to utility constant welfare measures.
In this paper, we extend the results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) to derive sharp
bounds on predicted demand responses and on welfare calculations under SARP.3 These bounds are
sharp for SARP. For reasons which will become clear we refer to these bounds as iterated bounds, or
i-bounds. We also show how the method originally presented in Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003)
can be adapted to provide sharp nonparametric bounds on compensating and equivalent variations.
For compactness, we will only present and discuss theoretical results in our following exposition.
However, as we will also indicate, these results imply an easy-to-implement method for dening tight-
est (iterated) bounds on Marshallian demands and compensating and equivalent variations. Evidently,
bringing this method to observational data necessarily requires dealing with empirical issues such as
measurement error and (un)observed heterogeneity. Here, we can refer to Blundell, Browning and Craw-
ford (2003, 2008) and Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin (2010); these authors propose methodological
extensions for dealing with these issues that are directly applicable to the method we introduce below.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our iterated bounds on the
Marshallian demands for any number of goods, and we provide an easily implemented method for
computing these bounds. In Section 3, we introduce the corresponding method for identifying the
tightest bounds on compensating and equivalent variations.
2 Iterated bounds on Marshallian demands
To set the stage, we rst briey recapture the concept of e-bounds introduced by Blundell, Browning
and Crawford (2008, henceforth BBC (2008)). Subsequently, we take the sequential maximum power
1See Blundell (2005), Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2007) and Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin (2010) for recent
contributions that build further on the basic insights of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008).
2Note that in situations in which there are only two goods transitivity adds no further restrictions to the weak axiom
(see Rose, 1958).
3 In terms of RP restrictions, the recovery of demand responses under WalrasLaw, homogeneity of degree zero and
negative semi-deniteness of the Slutsky matrix is equivalent to imposition of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP), whereas the requirement that these demands are consistent with full rationality amounts to the Strong Axiom
of Revealed Preference (WARP) (see Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein, 1976).
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path idea for constructing bounds on welfare measures developed in Blundell, Browning and Crawford
(2003, BBC (2003)) and use this to introduce the notion of iterated bounds on Marshallian demands.
We present an example to demonstrate that these bounds can be used to improve upon the e-bounds
if there are more than two goods. Given this result, we next show that our iterated bounds procedure
leads to tightest bounds on Marshallian demands. We end this section by presenting an algorithm
to compute the iterated bounds. As we will indicate, this algorithm essentially iterates a procedure
originally proposed by BBC (2003), which explains the name iterated bounds.
2.1 E-bounds
We assume J goods. For each consumer there exists a set of (nonnegative) Marshallian demand functions
q(p;x) for prices p 2 RJ++ and income x 2 R++. Following BBC (2008), we assume uniqueness of
demands.
Assumption 1 (uniqueness of demands) For each consumer there exists a set of demand functions
q(p;x) : RJ+1++ ! RJ+, which satisfy adding up, i.e. p0q(p; x) = x for all prices p and incomes x.
Consider a set of T price vectors fptgt=1;:::;T ; we say there are T observations. For a given price
vector pt we denote the J-valued demand associated with income x as qt (x), and we refer to the
function qt as the expansion path that corresponds to the prices pt. Again, we follow BBC (2008) by
assuming weak normality of qt.
Assumption 2 (weak normality) If x > x0, then qt(x)  qt(x0) for all pt.
BBC (2008) address the following question: Given a new budget fpN ; xNg and a set of observed
prices and expansion paths fpt;qt (x)gt=1;:::;T , what values of qN , which exhaust the budget (i.e.
p0NqN = xN ), are consistent with these observed demands and utility maximization?Let us denote
the bundles that exhaust the new budget fpN ; xNg by B(pN ; xN ) = fqN 2 RJ+jp0NqN = xNg.
To state BBC (2008)s answer to their question, we rst need to introduce some revealed preferences
(RP) concepts. We start by dening direct revealed preference relations R0.
Denition 1 (direct revealed preference) If at prices pt and income xt the consumer chooses
qt (xt) and p0tqt (xt)  p0tqs (xs), then qt (xt)R0qs (xs).
Transitivity of preferences then leads to the next concept of indirect revealed preference relations R.
Denition 2 (indirect revealed preference) If we have a sequence qt (xt) R0 qu (xu) R0qv (xv)
   R0 qw (xw) R0 qs (xs), then qt (xt) R qs (xs).
In our following exposition, we will consider two consistency conditions for utility maximizing con-
sumer behaviour: the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference (SARP). It is well-known that SARP is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for utility
maximization, while WARP is only a necessary condition (see Varian, 1982 and 2006, for a detailed
discussion).
Denition 3 (WARP and SARP)
(i) The demands qt (xt), t = 1; :::; T , satisfy WARP if qt (xt)R0 qs (xs) and qt (xt) 6= qs (xs) then not
qs (xs)R
0 qt (xt) for any s and t.
(ii) The demands qt (xt), t = 1; :::; T , satisfy SARP if qt (xt)R qs (xs) and qt (xt) 6= qs (xs) then not
qs (xs)R
0 qt (xt) for any s and t.
Because WARP only uses direct revealed preference relations R0, while SARP focuses on indirect
revealed preference relations R (so exploiting transitivity of preferences), we obtain that SARP is
a stronger condition than WARP. As in BBC (2008), we will assume that the expansion paths qt(x)
generate demands that are consistent with utility maximization. In RP terms, this implies the following
assumption.
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Assumption 3 (SARP) The demands qt(x), t = 1; : : : ; T and x 2 R++, satisfy SARP.
To formalize their notion of e-bounds, BBC (2008) use the concept of intersection demands. To fa-
cilitate our following comparison of BBC (2008)s e-bounds with our iterated bounds, we here introduce
these intersection demands in a slightly di¤erent way, i.e. in terms of intersection incomes.
Denition 4 (intersection income) The intersection income ~xt, for t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg, is the maximal
income for which
8qN 2 B(pN ; xN ) : qNR0qt(~xt):
The assumptions of uniqueness and normality ensure that each intersection income ~xt is uniquely
dened. More precisely, it is the income level such that p0Nqt(~xt)= xN . BBC (2008) refer to the
corresponding value of the expansion path, qt(~xt); as the intersection demand for observation t.
Given all this, BBC (2008) dene the support set
SBBC (pN ; xN ) =

qN :
qN 2 B(pN ; xN )
fpN ;pt;qN ;qt(~xt)gt=1;:::;T satisfy SARP

;
and they label the bounds on demand responses that are based on SBBC (pN ; xN ) as e-bounds.
To end this section, we present a specic characterization of the support set SBBC(pN ; xN ). As
we will explain, this characterization will directly motivate our following research question, i.e. dene
iterated bounds that improve upon the e-bounds. Essentially, the next proposition distinguishes
between two cases for qN 2 SBBC (pN ; xN ): either qN is di¤erent from the intersection demand qt(~xt)
for any observation t, or we have qN = qs(~xs) for some observation s.4 The Appendix contains the
proofs of all our results.
Proposition 1 (protable characterization of SBBC (pN ; xN )) For any qN in the budget set B(pN ; xN ),
we have that qN is in the support set SBBC (pN ; xN ) (i.e. meets the e-bounds) if and only if
(i) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg : p0tqt(~xt) < p0tqN ; or
(ii) 9s 2 f1; : : : ; Tg : qN = qs(~xs), and then p0tqt(~xt) < p0tqN for all t 2 f1; : : : Tgnfsg.
Inspection of Proposition 1 reveals that the denition of e-bounds nowhere exploits transitivity
of preferences, which is captured by the indirect revealed preference relations R. Specically, any
qN 2 SBBC (pN ; xN ) can be characterized in terms of direct revealed preference relations R0, i.e. it
satises




which follows from the denition of the intersection demands, and
p0tqt(~xt) < p
0
tqN (i.e. not qt(~xt)R
0qN ),
which follows from Proposition 1. Putting it di¤erently, e-bounds only use the empirical restrictions that
are implied by WARP consistency. However, as indicated above, utility maximizing behaviour requires
SARP consistency, which generally involves further restrictions than WARP consistency.5 Therefore, in
what follows we will dene iterated bounds that do fully exploit the restrictions implied by transitivity
of preferences. Essentially, this will require generalizations of the concepts intersection income and
intersection demand that are based on the relations R (instead of R0).
2.2 I-bounds
We dene iterated bounds, or i-bounds, as bounds on demand responses based on a support set
S (pN ; xN ) that accounts for all possible incomes xt (rather than only ~xt), i.e.
4Note that we make the (implicit) assumption that every observation t corresponds to a di¤erent intersection demand
qt(~xt). Dropping this assumption is actually straightforward, but it would substantially complicate the statement of
Proposition 1 without really adding new insights. A similar qualication applies to Proposition 2.
5 In this respect, one may also state that E-bounds are best WARP-based bounds but not best SARP-based bounds.
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S (pN ; xN ) =

qN :
qN 2 B(pN ; xN )
fpN ;pt;qN ;qt(xt)gt=1;:::;T satisfy SARP

:
Because this set S (pN ; xN ) considers all demands on the expansion paths qt, it is the tightest (i.e.
smallest) SARP-based support set by construction. In turn, this implies that i-bounds are tightest
bounds on demand responses. However, as it is formulated here, the set S (pN ; xN ) is not directly
useful from a practical point of view: for each t, it requires considering innitely many points on every
expansion path. To derive an operational characterization of S (pN ; xN ), we will make use of the
following notion of most informative income.
Denition 5 (most informative income) The most informative income bxt, for t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg, is
the maximal income for which
8qN 2 B(pN ; xN ) : qNRqt(bxt);
i.e. there exist xu; xv; : : : ; xw such that qN R0 qu(xu) R0 qv(xv) . . . R0 qw(xw) R0 qt(bxt).
This concept of most informative income extends the earlier notion of intersection income by using
indirect revealed preference relations R instead of (only) direct revealed preference relations R0. Because
the relations R include the relations R0 by construction, we obtain bxt  ~xt. Like before, the assumptions
of uniqueness and weak normality make that most informative incomes bxt are uniquely dened. However,
in contrast to intersection incomes, there is no closed formula for computing most informative incomes.
Fortunately, as we will discuss in Section 2.3, we can dene an easy-to-implement (nite and e¢ cient)
algorithm to compute bxt by iterating the procedure for computing the intersection incomes. Analogous
to before, we will refer to the associated value of the expansion path, qt(bxt), as the most informative
demand for observation t.
The next proposition provides a characterization of the set S (pN ; xN ) that parallels the one of
SBBC (pN ; xN ) in Proposition 1. It also provides a specic denition of S (pN ; xN ) in terms of the
most informative incomes bxt. In practical applications, this allows for constructing the set S (pN ; xN )
once these most informative incomes have been identied.
Proposition 2 (protable characterization of S (pN ; xN )) For any qN in the budget set B(pN ; xN ),
we have that qN is in the support set S (pN ; xN ) (i.e. meets the tightest bounds) if and only if
(i) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg : p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN ; or
(ii) 9s 2 f1; : : : ; Tg : qN = qs(bxs) and then p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN for all t 2 f1; : : : Tgnfsg.
We conclude this section by Example 1, which demonstrates that BBC (2008)s support set SBBC (pN ; xN )
(yielding e-bounds on demand responses) need not coincide with the smallest SARP-based support set
S (pN ; xN ) (yielding iterated or tightest bounds on demand responses). The example also illustrates the
central intuition behind this result. Specically, it presents expansion paths where, for some t (t = 1 in
Example 1), the most informative income bxt is strictly above the intersection income ~xt, which implies
that there exists qN with qNRqt(bxt) but not qNR0qt(bxt). Because the set S (pN ; xN ) must satisfy
SARP, this yields the restriction p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN ; which is stronger than p0tqt(~xt) < p0tqN (becausebxt > ~xt). In turn, this e¤ectively excludes from the set S (pN ; xN ) some qN that belongs to the set
SBBC(pN ; xN ). This demonstrates that, in general, we can have S (pN ; xN ) ( SBBC (pN ; xN ).
As a nal note, we emphasize that we need more than two goods for S (pN ; xN ) ( SBBC (pN ; xN ).
Indeed, as indicated above, the support set SBBC (pN ; xN ) exploits the empirical restrictions implied
by WARP consistency. And it is well-known that WARP and SARP have the same empirical content if
there are only two goods (see Rose, 1958), so that we always get S (pN ; xN ) = SBBC (pN ; xN ) in this
case.
Example 1 We consider the support set SBBC(pN ; xN ) for pN = (3; 2; 4) and xN = 15. Suppose
we observe two expansion paths q1 and q2, which are associated with the prices p1 = (4; 3; 2) and
p2 = (2; 4; 3).
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Suppose we have the intersection incomes ~x1 = 13:5 and ~x2 = 15:8, with corresponding intersection
demands
q1(~x1) = (2; 0:5; 2) and q2(~x2) = (2:3; 2:05; 1):
Next, we assume the following most informative incomes. Let bx1 = 15 > ~x1, with
q1(bx1) = (2; 1; 2);
while bx2 = ex2 and, thus, q2(~x2) = q2(bx2). We remark that an expansion path q1(x1) containing both
q1(bx1) and q1(~x1) does not conict with our earlier assumptions.
We can then show that S (pN ; xN ) ( SBBC (pN ; xN ). To obtain the result, it su¢ ces to show that there
exists qN with
qN 2 SBBC(pN ; xN ) and qN =2 S(pN ; xN ):
For the current example, this applies to qN = (1; 2; 2) (which e¤ectively meets p0NqN = xN ). First, we
can verify that qN 2 SBBC(pN ; xN ): the demands qN ; q1(~x1), q2(~x2) satisfy SARP (with qN R0 q2(~x2)
R0 q1(~x1)). On the other hand, we also obtain q0 =2 S(pN ; xN ): the demands qN ; q1(bx1), q2(bx2) do not
meet SARP, which a fortiori implies qN =2 S(pN ; xN ); in particular, we get qNR0q2(bx2)R0q1(bx1)R0qN .6
2.3 An algorithm for computing most informative incomes
The following algorithm uses the approach in BBC (2003) to dene the most informative incomes
x̂1; : : : ; x̂T and, thus, also the corresponding demands q1(x̂1); : : : ;qT (x̂T ).
Algorithm 1 (computing most informative incomes)
Input: fpN ; xNg and fp1; : : : ;pT ;q1 (x1) ; : : : ;qT (xT )g.
Output: x̂1; : : : ; x̂T .
Step 0: Set s = 0 and Fs = fx1; : : : ; xT jp0Nq1 (x1) = xN ; : : : ;p0NqT (xT ) = xNg.
Step 1: Set Fs+1 =

argmaxxt2Fs (xt = p
0





Step 2: If Fs+1  Fs then set fx̂1; : : : ; x̂T g = Fs+1 and stop. Else set s = s+ 1 and go to Step 1.
Note that Step 0 of this algorithm delivers the intersection incomes ~xt, which BBC (2008) orig-
inally considered to dene their e-bounds on Marshallian demands. To dene our most informative
incomes bxt (and so i-bounds on Marshallian demands), we iterate this procedure in Steps 1 and
2. This iteration implies that most informative incomes may e¤ectively exceed intersection incomes
(i.e. bxt > ~xt). As explained in our discussion of Example 1, such an instance e¤ectively obtains
S (pN ; xN ) ( SBBC (pN ; xN ).
The following lemma states two important properties of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1
(i) Algorithm 1 converges in a nite number of steps.
(ii) For any xt we have qt(x̂t)  qt (xt), qNRqt (xt) for any qN 2 S(pN ; xN ):
Property (i) shows that the algorithm is feasible in nite time, which is a minimal requirement for
practical applicability. Next, property (ii) states that each demand qt(x̂t) represents the highest point
on the expansion path qt that is revealed worse than any bundle in the support set S(pN ; xN ).
Two further remarks are in order. First, our earlier assumptions ensure that any income level com-
puted in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 is uniquely dened. As such, computing any set Fs+1 is straightforward.
Moreover, one can show that the worst case complexity of this algorithm is T 3, which makes that the
algorithm is e¢ ciently implemented.7
6For completeness, we add that the set S (pN ; xN ) is not empty, as is easily veried.
7For the sake of brevity, we do not include a formal proof of this statement here, but it is available upon request.
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Second, it is interesting to note that Algorithm 1 can also be used to extend the bestSARP-based
test that was originally proposed by BBC (2003).8 Specically, using information on expansion paths
qt (t = 1; :::; T ), these authors dene a best possible test for SARP consistency of a particular quantity
bundle qN (xN ) (with N 2 f1; :::; Tg) that is conditional on some a priori dened (revealed preference)
ordering of the observations. Algorithm 1 provides the basis for an alternative besttest: we can use the
algorithm to dene the set S(pN ; xN ), so that we can subsequently check whether qN (xN ) 2 S(pN ; xN )
(i.e. qN (xN ) is SARP consistent) or qN (xN ) =2 S(pN ; xN ) (i.e. qN (xN ) is SARP inconsistent). It
can be veried that this alternative test actually is formally identical to the one of BBC (2003), except
from the important di¤erence that it does not require a prior ordering specication - it simultaneously
considers all possible (T !) orderings of the T observations.
3 Compensating and equivalent variations
In this section, we use the results outlined above to dene tightest bounds on compensating and equiv-
alent variations. We rst present formal denitions of compensating and equivalent variations. Subse-
quently, we show how to compute tightest bounds on these welfare measures by using our results of the
previous sections.
Suppose the policy maker wants to compare two situations characterized by di¤erent price regimes:
pO 2 RJ++ represents original (observed; pre-reform) prices and pN 2 RJ++ represents new (unobserved;
post-reform) prices. Income is the same in the two situations, i.e. xO = xN . Let e (p; u) be the
expenditure function that associates minimal expenditure with prices p and utility u. By construction,
rational consumer behaviour implies e (pO; uO) = e (pN ; uN ) = xN (= xO) (where we assume that the
total budget is xed). Then, we get the following denitions.
Denition 6 (compensating and equivalent variations)
(i) Compensating variation CV = e (pN ; uN )  e (pN ; uO) = xN   e (pN ; uO).
(ii) Equivalent variation EV = e (pO; uN )  e (pO; uO) = e (pO; uN )  xN :
Tightest bounds for CV. To bound CV , we need to dene bounds on e (pN ; uO). To do so, we
can use the bounds on the cost function established by BBC (2003). Specically, because q (pO; xN ) is
assumed to be the observed (pre-reform) demand, we can use the bounds for the cost function c (qO;pN )
(that gives the minimal cost for obtaining a bundle on the same indi¤erence curve as qO at prices pN
- this function is equivalent to the expenditure function evaluated at the utility level uO generated by
qO and prices pN . We can thus use the Algorithms A and B of BBC (2003) to obtain tightest bounds
for CV.
Tightest bounds for EV. To bound EV, we need tightest bounds on e (pO; uN ). Let eL denote
the tightest (= highest) lower bound and eU the tightest (= lowest) upper bound, so that eL 
e (pO; uN )  eU . The next algorithm computes eL and eU . (In the algorithm, we make use of the
vectors Pj 2 RJ of which all components are zero except for the j-th component, which equals one.)
Algorithm 2 (computing iterated bounds on EV )
Input: fpN ; xNg and fp1; : : : ;pT ;q1 (x1) ; : : : ;qT (xT )g.
Output: eL and eU .
Step 1: Use Algorithm 1 to compute the most informative incomes x̂1; : : : ; x̂T .
Step 2: Set W (pN ; xN ) = ;. For any k 2 f0; : : : ; J   1g, take any selection of k mutually di¤erent
j1; : : : ; jk 2 f1; : : : ; Tg and any selection of J 1 k mutually di¤erent jk+1; : : : ; jJ 1 2 f1; : : : ; Jg.
8BBC (2003) originally introduced a (best) test based on the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP)
rather than SARP (which we consider here, following BBC (2008)). However, it is straightforward to adapt their ideas
to obtain a best SARP-based test. See, for example, Varian (1982 and 2006) for the subtle di¤erence between SARP and
GARP.
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If pN ;pj1 ; : : : ;pjk ;Pjk+1 ; : : : ;PjJ 1 are J linear independent vectors, then compute the unique
qN 2 RJ that solves p0NqN = xN , p0j1qN = x̂j1 , . . . , p
0
jk
qN = x̂jk , P
0
jk+1




0 and add qN to W (pN ; xN ). Else take another selection or go to the next k.
Step 3: Set V (pN ; xN ) = ;. Compute V (pN ; xN ) =W (pN ; xN ) \ S (pN ; xN ).




Step 5: Set eL = minqN2V (pN ;xN ) e
L
qN and e
U = maxqN2V (pN ;xN ) e
U
qN .
This algorithm is very easy-to-implement and will e¢ ciently compute eL and eU . More precisely, we
can refer to our discussion on the e¢ ciency of Algorithm 1 in the previous section, which carries over
to BBC (2003)s Algorithms A and B (which are formally similar to Algorithm 1). Next, Proposition
2 implies that the closure of S(pN ; xN ) is a convex set dened by linear constraints. Steps 2 and 3 of
Algorithm 2 then compute the extreme points (or vertices) of this convex set. Essentially, dening each
such extreme point boils down to nding the unique solution of a system with J linear constraints that
follow from the characterization of the convex set. That is, the budget constraint (i.e. p0NqN = xN ),
the constraints corresponding to a selection of k observations (i.e. p0j1qN = x̂j1 , . . . , p
0
jk
qN = x̂jk) and
J   1  k positivity constraints (i.e. P0jk+1qN = 0; : : : ;P
0
jJ 1
qN = 0).9 Some of the solutions of Step 2
do not necessarily belong to the support set S (pN ; xN ), which is why we need the additional Step 3 to
obtain only the relevant points (i.e. the extreme points). Finally, by construction the set V (pN ; xN ) is
nite and discrete, which implies that Step 4 of Algorithm 2 is computable in nite time.
Example 2 illustrates the di¤erent steps of Algorithm 2. The following lemma formally states that
the algorithm e¤ectively compute the tightest bounds on EV.
Lemma 2 (iterated bounds are tightest) The values eL and eU produced by Algorithm 2 dene
tightest bounds on EV.
Example 2 Figure 1 graphically illustrates the intuition behind Algorithm 2. For simplicity, we focus
on a setting with only two goods and three observed price vectors (i.e. three expansion paths). The upper-
left panel of the gure shows the support set S (pN ; xN ), which corresponds to the bold line segment.10
The set S (pN ; xN ) is characterized by the most informative incomes x̂1; x̂2 and x̂3, which are obtained
through Step 1 of Algorithm 2. The corresponding set of extreme points V (pN ; xN ) = fqN1; qN2g; this
set is constructed in Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 2. The upper-right and lower-left panels of Figure 1 then
show the inner and outer bounds for the indi¤erence curves associated with, respectively, qN1 and qN2.11
In turn, this denes the lower bounds eLqN1 and e
L




qN2 , which are
generated in Step 4 of Algorithm 2. Finally, the lower-right panel of Figure 1 shows the resulting values











9Although Step 2 is directly implementable, we also note that it should not be the most e¢ cient way to compute
the extreme points of our convex set. Indeed, given that this set is characterized by linear constraints, computing these
extreme points is equivalent to nding all basic feasible solutions of a system of linear equations. Alternative algorithms
for computing these basic feasible solutions are available in the Operations Research literature.
10Since there are only two goods in this example, the support set S (pN ; xN ) actually coincides with BBCs support
set SBBC (pN ; xN ), which are characterized by intersection demands (see Proposition 1). (Correspondingly, the most
informative incomes x̂1; x̂2 and x̂3 equal the intersection incomes ex1; ex2 and ex3.) As explained above, the sets S (pN ; xN )
and SBBC (pN ; xN ) need not coincide in case there are more than two goods. We choose to focus on a two-goods setting
here as this allows us to better illustrate the mechanics of Algorithm 2.
11These bounds for indi¤erence curves are (implicitly) constructed in Algorithms A and B of BBC (2003). We refer to
these authors for a detailed discussion on the construction method. See in particular their Figure 7.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Algorithm 2
9
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have complemented and generalized the results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford
(2003, 2008). We dened tightest iterated (nonparametric) bounds on Marshallian demands that
apply to any number of goods. These bounds are sharp under the strong axiom of revealed preference,
SARP. We were thus able to show they provide sharp bounds for welfare measures.
We have established a complete toolkit for a powerful nonparametric welfare analysis based on
Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. We show that our iterated bounds method involves
computational algorithms that are easily implemented.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By construction we have qNR0qt(~xt) for any qN 2 B(pN ; xN ). If qN 2 SBBC(pN ; xN ) and qN 6= qt(~xt)
for all t, then SARP consistency for qNR0qt(~xt) implies that p0tqt(~xt) < p
0
tqN (i.e. not qt(~xt)R
0qN ).
Next, if qN = qs(~xs) 2 SBBC(pN ; xN ) for some s, then SARP consistency requires the same for all
observations t 6= s.
Conversely, take any qN 2 B(pN ; xN ), then p0tqt(~xt) < p0tqN for all t (i.e. condition (i) holds) excludes
qt(~xt)RqN . So a rejection of SARP requires qNRqt(~xt) and p0tqt(~xt)  p0tqN (i.e. qt(~xt)R0qN ). But
this last inequality is excluded by assumption, and thus qN 2 SBBC (pN ; xN ). A similar reasoning
holds for qN = qs(~xs) (i.e. if condition (ii) holds).
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose qN 2 S(pN ; xN ) and qN 6= qt(bxt) for all t. By construction we have that qNRqt(bxt) for
any qN 2 B(pN ; xN ). So SARP consistency requires that p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN . Next, assume that
qN = qs(bxs) 2 S(pN ; xN ) for some s. Then, SARP consistency requires the same for all t 6= s.
Conversely, take any qN 2 B(pN ; xN ) and suppose that p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN for all t (i.e. condition
(i) holds). Then, normality implies for all xt  bxt that p0tqt(xt)  p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN . Therefore, by
Denition 5 and the above, we cannot have qt(xt)RqN . As such, there can be a rejection of SARP
only if, for some income xt, we have qNRqt(xt) and p0tqt(xt)  p0tqN . Suppose, then, that we do
have such a rejection, i.e. there exists an income xt for which qNRqt(xt) and p0tqt(xt)  p0tqN .
Since p0tqt(bxt) < p0tqN , normality implies that xt > bxt. This gives us the wanted contradiction, since
Denition 5 and the above then exclude qNRqt(xt).
A similar reasoning holds for qN = qs(bxs) (i.e. condition (ii) holds), which nishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1
Algorithm 1 is similar to Algorithm B of BBC (2003). Given this, we can straightforwardly adapt the
proof of these authorsProposition 3 to obtain the result stated in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
To bound EV and thus e(pO; uN ), we need to nd, for any qN 2 S(pN ; xN ); the nonparametrically
constructed revealed-preferredset RP (qN ), which contains all bundles to which qN is preferred to,
and the not-revealed-worseset NRW (qN ), which contains all bundles that are not revealed worse to
qN . (See Varian (1982) for an extensive discussion of the sets RP (qN ) and NRW (qN ).)
Given our results in Section 2, we can dene tightest bounds on EV by computing eLqN (resp. e
U
qN )
for any qN 2 S(pN ; xN ). Now, Proposition 2 implies that the closure of S(pN ; xN ) is a convex set and,
as discussed in the main text, V (pN ; xN ) contains all the extreme points of this convex set. As such,
we get that any qN 2 S(pN ; xN ) can be written as a convex combination of elements of V (pN ; xN ),
i.e. qN =
P
k kqk (with k > 0 and
P
k k = 1) for qk 2 V (pN ; xN ).
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Given this, and using convexity of preferences (represented by the sets RP (qN ) and NRW (qN )),
we get RP (qN )  RP (qk) for at least one qk 2 V (pN ; xN ) and also that NRW (qN )  NRW (qk)
for at least one, possibly di¤erent, qk 2 V (pN ; xN ). As such, in order to nonparametrically identify the
lower bound eL (respectively, upper bound eU ), we need to take the minimum (respectively, maximum)
of the lower (respectively, upper) bounds over all the elements of V (pN ; xN ), i.e. eL = minqN2V (pN ;xN )
eLqN and e
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